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Applying Daubert Inconsistently? 
PROOF OF INDIVIDUAL CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT 
AND FORENSIC CASES 
Joseph Sanders† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 ushered 
in a new era in the assessment of expert testimony. Daubert 
and its two companion cases in the “Daubert trilogy,” General 
Electric v. Joiner2 and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,3 drastically 
altered the law governing the admissibility of expert evidence.4 
In the federal courts and in a substantial majority of state 
courts, the old Frye rule was swept aside for a new, 
multifaceted test.5 All three of these cases involved a causal 
  
 † Thanks to Edward Cheng for helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am 
particularly honored to be part of a festschrift for Margaret Berger. One anecdote tells 
all. Not long after the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceutical, Margaret and I each published an article in the Minnesota Law 
Review. Our articles were grouped together as a “special issue” on Daubert. One of my 
colleagues later jokingly commented that I must be special to be one half of an entire 
special issue. I replied, no, Margaret’s article was the special issue and I tagged along. 
By the way, her article, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. 
L. REV. 1345(1994) was an early beacon for judges grappling with this new 
admissibility rule. 
 1 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 3 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 4 The Federal Rules of Evidence have been changed to reflect these cases. 
Most importantly, Rule 702 now reads: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony 
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.  
FED. R. EVID. 702 (changes in italics). 
 5 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). According to the Frye 
test, scientific evidence should be admitted only when the scientific principle upon 
which the expert’s testimony is based is “sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Id. at 1014. 
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question and challenges to causal assertions have remained at 
the very center of admissibility law. The costs and benefits of 
this filter on expert causal assertions has been the source of 
considerable controversy.6 One aspect of the controversy is a 
concern that the standard is not applied in a consistent manner.  
Inconsistency appears in many guises. There is inter-
jurisdictional inconsistency between the federal and state 
courts that have adopted Daubert and the state courts that 
continue to apply the Frye test.7 Even among jurisdictions 
employing the same test, there is substantial variation.8  
More worrisome, perhaps, are inconsistencies within 
jurisdictions. In this regard, the most frequently discussed 
inconsistency is between civil and criminal cases. A number of 
people note that courts are more likely to permit causation 
experts, especially the state’s experts, to testify in criminal cases 
than in civil cases. For example, Professor Berger notes that,  
In civil cases, courts engage in rigorous gatekeeping and often exclude 
plaintiffs’ experts because the theory underlying their testimony has 
not been adequately validated. But I see no sign of a parallel approach 
in criminal cases even [where] there are problems with the 
assumptions on which the prosecution’s expert testimony rests.9  
Others have made similar observations10 and this conclusion is 
supported by several empirical studies.11 On the other hand, 
  
 6 See generally Symposium, A Cross-Disciplinary Look at Scientific Truth: 
What’s the Law to Do?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 847 (2008).  
 7 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923). See David E. 
Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 
351 (2004); John M. Conley &, Scott W. Gaylord, Scientific Evidence in the State 
Courts: Daubert and the Problem of Outcomes, 44 NO. 4 JUDGES’ J. 6, 6 (2005). 
 8 For example, within both Frye and Daubert jurisdictions differences exist 
as to whether the admissibility decision should be restricted to novel scientific 
evidence; whether courts should distinguish between scientific evidence and other 
types of expert testimony, and, if so, what test should be employed for experience 
testimony. See generally David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes: The “Opinion Rule” 
and Other Oddities and Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, the Scientific Revolution, and 
Common Sense, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 699 (2008); Joseph Sanders, Daubert, Frye, And the 
States: Thoughts on the Choice of a Standard, in POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE 
WHOLE TRUTH? EXPERTS, EVIDENCE, AND THE BLINDFOLDING OF THE JURY 5 (2007), 
available at http://poundinstitute org/images/2006ForumReport.pdf. 
 9 Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions 
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003). 
 10 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1072-73 (2003) (discussing difference between civil and 
criminal applications of Daubert standard); Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of 
Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 105, 109-10 (2003). 
 11 See Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility 
of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
339, 364 (2002) (“[T]he Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of 
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many have argued that the admissibility bar is set too high on 
the civil side.12 
In this article, I argue that we misunderstand the 
nature and cause of the inconsistency when we lump together 
all toxic tort cases and compare them to all forensic cases. If we 
disaggregate the toxic tort admissibility opinions that deal with 
general questions (e.g., whether asbestos causes lung cancer), 
and those that deal with causal questions that relate to the 
individual plaintiff, we see that experts testifying on the latter 
causal question are judged by admissibility standards that are 
nearly as liberal as the standards applied in forensic cases. On 
the other hand, with respect to one type of forensic proof, DNA 
testimony, the courts impose an admissibility standard at least 
as high as that used for general causation cases in toxic torts. 
It is the thesis of this article that the liberal standards 
applied with respect to specific causation and forensic experts 
have a similar source. They are the result of a gulf between the 
needs of the law and the products of science and they reflect a 
judiciary grappling with—or, in the forensic context, sometimes 
refusing to grapple with—the difficulties this presents for 
expert witness admissibility standards.13 
  
expert testimony at either the trial or appellate court levels.”); D. Michael Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the 
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 103-12 (2000) (providing empirical evidence that judges are 
more likely to admit prosecution expert testimony than other types of expert testimony). 
For a review of the empirical findings, see Faigman, supra note 8, at 717-18. 
 12 Among the critical articles are: Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. 
Capone, Admissibility Standards as Politics—The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1025 (2003); Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between 
Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in 
Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 324 (2001); Margaret A. Berger 
& Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 257 (2005); Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance 
and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability 
Reform?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 15 (2001); Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the 
Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role 
to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 337 (1999); Allan Kanner & 
M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 
(2007); Bobak Razavi, Admissible Expert Testimony and Summary Judgment, 29 J. 
LEGAL MED. 307 (2008).  
 13 After I had completed this article, David Faigman shared with me his 
contribution to this festschrift. His article, Evidentiary Incommensurability: A 
Preliminary Exploration of the Problem of Reasoning from General Scientific Data to 
Individualized Legal Decision Making, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1115 (2010), makes many of 
the points I make in this article concerning the gulf between the causal generalizations 
of most scientific inquiry and the specific causal analyses required in individual trials. 
See also DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE 
LAW 69 (1999). 
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In Part II, I describe the gulf between the search for 
generalities in science and the need for particulars in law. In 
Parts III and IV, I discuss the effect of this gulf, first with 
respect to toxic tort “specific causation” experts and, second, 
with respect to forensic experts. In both areas, the relative 
weakness of the available empirical evidence leads courts to 
adopt liberal admissibility standards. Part V briefly 
summarizes the discussion in the previous two sections. Part 
VI argues that the liberal admissibility standards applied in 
these two areas are but two instantiations of law’s general 
contextual approach to knowledge.14 By and large, this 
contextual approach serves the legal system well, but in some 
situations it produces less than optimal levels of expertise. This 
occurs because the courts fail to adopt a contextual approach 
that attends to the future as well as to the case being decided. I 
outline the circumstances in which a longer view may serve us 
well and argue that those circumstances exist in the forensic 
arena. Part VII discusses alternatives open to the courts if they 
wish to adopt this longer view. The article ends with a brief 
summary of the argument. 
II. THE SCIENCE-LAW DISCONNECT 
There is a disconnect between science and law, and this 
disconnect helps to explain how law approaches certain types of 
causal questions. The disconnect is simply this: the law’s 
search for causal information about a particular case often 
finds little or no help from science. In order to understand this 
problem, I need to say a bit about the scientific enterprise. 
Those who study the doing of science would generally agree 
that there is no special “scientific method” that is different 
from and better than other ways of understanding the world.15 
However, science is chock full of specific theories and 
methodological prescriptions concerning how to test these 
  
 14 A contextual approach varies the justification needed to hold a belief 
depending upon the quantity and quality of the available evidence. 
 15 As Susan Haack notes: 
What is distinctive about natural-scientific inquiry isn’t that it uses a 
particular mode or modes of inference, but the vast range of helps to inquiry 
scientists have developed, many of them B specific instruments, specific kinds 
of precaution against experimental error, specific models and metaphors B 
local to this or that field or sub-discipline.  
SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND 
CYNICISM 167 (2003). 
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theories. A substantial part of having what passes for scientific 
expertise in a field is an ability to understand and use the tools 
of the trade. 
Susan Haack divides these aids to understanding into 
several categories, including helps to the senses and helps to 
reasoning.16 Instruments that expand our senses are at the very 
heart of progress in physics, astronomy, chemistry, and biology 
as well as practical disciplines such as medicine and 
engineering. Aids to reasoning are also critical. These include 
mathematics in its many different forms as well as experimental 
and quasi-experimental designs and other investigatory devices 
designed to assist in making causal assertions.17  
For purposes of this article, I focus on the second set of 
aids: aids to reasoning. Most of the common mathematical and 
logical aids to reasoning employed by science are designed to 
facilitate not simply inquiry, but inquiry of a certain type: 
inquiry into general laws or principles. This does not mean that 
scientists are uninterested in the particular case; many 
scientists and individuals in fields that rely on science, such as 
engineering, devote most of their energy to specific situations. 
But the heroes of science are those who are able to put forth 
explanations in terms of general laws that explain a myriad of 
particular observations.  
This interest in the general and the generalizable leads 
to a second component of scientific conventions, the lack of a 
timetable. An inquiry takes as long as it takes and with respect 
to many questions the answer experts are most comfortable 
with is, “we don’t know.” “We don’t know” does not necessarily 
mean that we don’t have a guess. Often it means we do not 
  
 16 Id. at 98. 
 17 See WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, 
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL 
INFERENCE (2002). Even the social sciences play an important role in this process when 
they uncover and document the many systematic reasoning errors that result from 
judgment by heuristics and then suggest affirmative steps we might take to minimize 
such errors. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1059 (2000). 
  A third set of aids discussed by Haack are helps to evidence sharing and 
intellectual honesty. This includes things such as peer review, publication, replication 
of findings and other formal and informal devices that involve scientists looking over 
each other’s shoulders. Often this peek over the shoulder focuses on the correct use of 
the first two types of aids; instruments, mathematics and experimental design. All of 
these aids are fallible and none guarantees that we will arrive at correct outcomes. 
From the supposed benefits of bleeding to the more recent realization that many ulcers 
have a bacteriological, not a psychological source, it is easy to point to occasions where 
we have been lead astray for lengthy periods of time. Collectively, however, these 
conventions are thought to facilitate inquiry over the long term.  
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have enough evidence of the kind we find persuasive to support 
a conclusion about a phenomenon.18 
If science tends to focus on systematic and general 
knowledge, most trials must deal with specific events. To be sure, 
law often is concerned with general questions, e.g., does drug X 
cause injury Y? However, it is also nearly always concerned with 
what happened to a specific person at a particular point in time. 
Did drug X cause the plaintiff’s injury? Were these fingerprints 
left at the crime scene those of the defendant? 
This inquiry into individual causation is accompanied 
by a mindset that is contrary to the “wait and see” attitude of 
science. Legal conventions ask experts to make a decision now 
based on the evidence at hand.19 Fred Prichard quotes the 
following passage from an expert confronting for the first time 
the law’s push for a decision now. 
Bill (the expert’s attorney) asked me a question about whether the 
belt was on or not, the lap belt. And I said, “Well, could have been. 
But then, it may not have been.” Woo, rockets went off. “What do you 
mean? You’re my expert in this case, and you say it ‘could be’ or 
‘couldn’t be?’ Look, I’m going to tell you. The other side doesn’t 
waffle. They pick one view. And they will push that view. And they 
will make their case in front of a jury. And there will be no 
misunderstanding. There will be no gray area. They will take a 
position one way or the other and make it stick. Now, they don’t 
have any other course of action. That’s their life. They make their 
living going in front of juries and making statements, whether they 
have facts to back them up or not. Now you, you can go back to 
designing cars. You have another career. They don’t. You better start 
thinking like they do.”20 
This anecdotal evidence is supported by survey 
research. Champagne et al. report that 56% of the experts they 
  
 18 When a community of investigators say this they are referring to evidence 
which is derived from the application of the aids to reasoning (and the instruments) to 
which a field of inquiry is committed. There may not be a “scientific method” writ large, 
but there are methods and aids to inquiry to which communities of scholars are 
committed and evidence derived from these techniques enjoy greater warrant in the 
community than other types of evidence. Over time, these methods may change as new 
ways to collect and observe are created. Methods are, ultimately, simply tools and a 
new problem may call for new tools. In this sense, methodology is a pragmatic search 
for what works. However, at any given point in time the ability of an investigator to 
persuade her peers about some hypothesis without the use of these devices and 
methods is limited. 
 19 Herbert Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting 
Norms in the Courtroom, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 48 (2009). 
 20 FRED PRICHARD, EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES: AN INSIDE VIEW 30-31 (2005). 
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interviewed say their lawyers ask them to be less tentative.21 
They found a similar percentage (57%) in a second, follow-up 
study.22 Perhaps more alarmingly, 12% of the experts in the 
first study and 22% in the second study agreed with the 
statement that lawyers try to get their experts to testify to 
issues for which there is no scientific basis.23  
How then should we summarize the conventions of 
science and law? Three scientific conventions are particularly 
relevant to this discussion: a) searching for the general and 
theoretical, b) doing so by employing the methods and 
techniques accepted by one’s field, and c) an attitude of 
agnosticism that encourages waiting for persuasive evidence 
before making up one’s mind.24 On the other hand, legal 
conventions: a) often focus on the specific event and b) push 
witnesses toward arriving at a conclusion.25  
For the moment, I wish to set aside the second 
difference, science’s wait-and-see attitude versus the law’s 
desire to arrive at a conclusion, and focus on the first 
difference. The fact that much of science focuses on 
understanding the general, while law is usually interested in 
the specific, does not always present difficulties. In some areas, 
the translation from the general to the specific is so well 
understood that one can reach nearly unanimous consensus 
about the cause of a specific event through the application of 
general principles. Engineering is often a case in point. For 
example, there were multiple hypotheses as to why the I-35 
bridge across the Mississippi River at Minneapolis suffered a 
catastrophic collapse on August 1, 2007.26 They included metal 
  
 21 Anthony Champagne, Daniel Shuman & Elizabeth Whitaker, An 
Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 31 
JURIMETRICS J. 375, 385 (1991). 
 22 Daniel W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony Champagne, An 
Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three 
City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 201 (1994). 
 23 Id.; Champagne et al., supra note 21, at 385. 
 24 A fourth scientific convention is “a commitment to sharing data, 
intellectual honesty, and disinterestedness.” Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, And The 
Expert Witness, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 66 (2009). I discuss this convention and 
how it differs from the legal view of expert knowledge as a partisan resource. I do not 
explore this difference in the present article. 
 25 Note that the second element in scientific conventions, a commitment to 
the methods and techniques of inquiry accepted by one’s field, has no direct parallel in 
legal conventions. I return to this point later in the article. See infra Part VI. 
 26 See Press Release, National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB 
Determines Inadequate Load Capacity Due to Design Errors of Gusset Plates Caused I-
35 Bridge to Collapse (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2008/ 
081114.html [hereinafter NTSB Press Release]; see also Stephen Flynn, Minn. Bridge 
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fatigue among other options.27 However, in November 2008, the 
National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the 
primary source of the failure was a design flaw.28 The bridge 
gusset plates were approximately half as thick as they should 
have been.29 This failure, combined with substantial increases 
in the weight of the bridge from earlier modifications and the 
storage of tons of construction material on the bridge at the 
time of collapse, caused the failure.30 Engineers were able to work 
from the general, e.g., the load bearing capacity of various 
materials and designs, to the specific flaw in this particular bridge. 
Unfortunately, this easy ability to understand the 
general case and then to translate from the general to the 
specific case is precisely what is absent in many civil and 
criminal cases.31 Whatever the evidence concerning the general 
principle, e.g., that Vioxx causes heart problems or that 
individual fingerprints are unique, translating this to the 
particular case is fraught with difficulty. In the next two 
sections, I discuss this problem first in the civil context and 
then in the criminal context. 
III. ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS IN TOXIC TORT CASES 
In no area has the Daubert revolution had a greater 
effect than in toxic torts. The number of cases in which expert 
causation testimony has been excluded must by now run into 
the thousands. Many commentators have reacted negatively to 
this trend, arguing that the bar has been set too high.32  
  
Collapse Reveals Brittle America: Expert Op-Ed, POPULAR MECHANICS, Aug. 2, 2007, 
available at http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/transportation/421998.html; 
Minnesota: Cause of Bridge Collapse is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at A20. 
 27 Id.  
 28 See NTSB Press Release, supra note 26; see also Matthew L. Wald, Bridge 
Collapse is Laid to Design Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at A19. 
 29 See NTSB Press Release, supra note 26. 
 30 Id.  
 31 This ability is not absent in all cases. DNA testing is an area where the 
transition from the general to the individual case is well understood. This is also true 
with respect to toxic torts that produce signature diseases. 
 32 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. This is especially troublesome to 
critics when the exclusion of the expert testimony results in a summary judgment for 
the defendant because the plaintiff no longer has any admissible evidence on causation.  
  Clearly, the bar is higher than it once was. Before Daubert, very few cases 
were concluded as a result of an expert witness admissibility determination. The 
Bendectin litigation, of which Daubert is a part, is a good example. Almost all the 
twenty-five or so Bendectin cases that were heard on the merits were tried to either a 
judge or a jury. Although the plaintiffs never prevailed in any of these cases, this was 
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I do not engage in this debate. Rather, I argue that the 
height of the bar depends on the causal question being 
addressed. The causal question in toxic tort cases is usually 
divided into two parts: general causation and specific 
causation. The general causation question is whether a 
substance or drug has been shown to harm any individuals. 
The specific causation question is whether the harm suffered 
by the plaintiff was caused by the substance or the drug in 
question.33 When evidence is excluded, is it usually because of a 
failure to present reliable evidence on general causation or a 
failure to present reliable evidence on specific causation? 
Unfortunately, the question is easier to pose than it is to 
answer. Within the toxic tort arena, most specific causation 
testimony is presented as “differential diagnosis” testimony.34 
But one cannot judge the frequency with which specific 
causation testimony is excluded simply by looking at the 
frequently with which “differential diagnosis” testimony is 
excluded. This is because most Daubert opinions rule on 
general causation before reaching the question of specific 
causation. They require plaintiffs to “rule in” the alleged causal 
agent, i.e., they must show that the agent causes the injury to 
some individuals, before “ruling out” other possible causes.35 
  
the result of defense verdicts or judicial reversal of plaintiff verdicts. See generally 
JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL (1998). 
 33 For a discussion of these terms, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 28 cmt. c (2005). 
 34 For discussions of differential diagnosis testimony, see Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of Testimony About Differential 
Diagnosis (Etiology): Of Under—and Over—Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 391 
(2004); Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential 
Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective 
and Substantive Law, 64 AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2001); Ian S. Spechler, 
Physicians at the Gates of Daubert: A Look at the Admissibility of Differential 
Diagnosis Testimony to Show External Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 26 REV. 
LITIG. 739 (2007). The term is itself problematical. When physicians use this term in 
their medical practice they are referring to the process of determining which disease 
produced a set of symptoms. However, in the legal arena the term is used to describe a 
process by which one searches for the cause of the underlying disease. The latter 
exercise might better be called “differential etiology.” Id.  
 35 In Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, the trial judge made the following comment: 
The process of differential diagnosis is undoubtedly important to the question 
of “specific causation.” If other possible causes of an injury cannot be ruled 
out, or at least the probability of their contribution to causation minimized, 
then the “more likely than not” threshold for proving causation may not be 
met. But, it is also important to recognize that a fundamental assumption 
underlying this method is that the final, suspected “cause” remaining after 
this process of elimination must actually be capable of causing the injury. 
That is, the expert must “rule in” the suspected cause as well as “rule out” 
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Specific causation witnesses are frequently excluded because 
neither they nor some other expert has provided sufficient 
evidence to “rule in” the suspect substance.36  
Once we set those cases aside, that is, once we look only 
to the cases where there is evidence of general causation, what 
evidence must the expert present in order to survive an 
admissibility challenge to the specific causation testimony? The 
answer is, not very much. 
In some Frye jurisdictions, experts conducting a 
differential diagnosis are considered to be “experience experts”37 
and are allowed to testify without any reliability filter.38 The 
  
other possible causes. And, of course, expert opinion on this issue of “general 
causation” must be derived from a scientifically valid methodology. 
892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th 
Cir. 1996). 
  The great majority of all federal cases on point come to the same 
conclusion. See 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 21:6 (2009). 
 36 Sometimes, the “ruling in” analysis focuses on the question of dosage. To 
how much of a substance was the plaintiff exposed? This, too, is best thought of as a 
question of general causation. See id. 
 37 Such experts are variously called “experience” experts, “opinion” experts, 
or “clinical” experts. David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and The 
(Partial) Failures of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451 (2008) (connoisseur 
evidence); Faigman, supra note 8 (opinion evidence); Joseph Sanders, Kumho and How 
We Know, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 373 (2001) (experience evidence).  
  Experience evidence is not restricted to civil cases. As several scholars 
have noted, much of the testimony of forensic experts may be viewed as experience 
evidence. See Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic 
Knowledge Claims in the Post-Daubert Era, 43 TULSA L. REV. 263, 276 (2007); Lyn 
Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Experiential or Scientific Expertise, 7 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 143 (2008). That is, the experts justify their opinion on the basis of 
their experience with respect to the task at hand. 
 38 For example, in Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiff offered 
expert testimony that his wife’s death was “direct[ly] and proximately cause[d]” by her 
ingestion of Parlodel, a drug taken to suppress lactation in women who chose not to 
nurse their newborn children. 14 P.3d 1170, 1173-75 (Kan. 2000). The defendant 
challenged the admissibility of this testimony. Id. at 1180. The Kansas Supreme court 
held that the Frye test is not applicable to cases where the expert offers “pure opinion” 
testimony. Id. at 1178. “The validity of pure opinion is tested by cross-examination of 
the witness.” Id. at 1179. The plaintiff’s three experts offered to testify that Parlodel 
caused or contributed to Bishop’s death. Id. at 1175. They arrived at this result 
through a process of “differential diagnosis” by which they considered and ruled out 
other causes. Id. at 1177. Apparently, Kuhn removes most if not all medical doctor 
differential diagnosis testimony from any judicial reliability assessment. 
  Florida also has adopted this position. In Marsh v. Valyou, echoing Kuhn, 
the court concluded that “[i]t is well-established that Frye is inapplicable to ‘pure 
opinion’ testimony. . . . [b]ecause testimony causally linking trauma to fibromyalgia is 
based on the experts’ experience and training, it is ‘pure opinion’ admissible without 
having to satisfy Frye.” 977 So. 2d 543, 548-49 (Fla. 2007). 
  The Arizona Supreme Court adopted a similar approach to expert 
testimony on repressed memory in Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 123 (2000). The 
Logerquist court said:  
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federal and state courts that have adopted Daubert, refuse to 
adopt this approach.39 However, as the following discussion 
indicates, they do not apply a strenuous admissibility standard 
for specific causation testimony. 
What are the admissibility standards? First the expert 
must offer more than simple temporal order, i.e., the injury 
followed the exposure and, therefore, the exposure caused the 
injury.40 Nevertheless, experts continue to offer this as proof of 
causation. The very fact that temporal order is so frequently 
the basis of exclusion is itself an indication of the relatively low 
threshold set for the admissibility of differential diagnosis 
testimony for in the context of many long latency period toxic 
torts temporal order is nearly no evidence at all.41 Plaintiff 
experts may also be excluded if they fail to address and rule out 
  
Although compliance with Frye is necessary when the scientist reaches a 
conclusion by applying a scientific theory or process based on the work or 
discovery of others, under [Arizona Rules of Evidence 702 and 703] experts 
may testify concerning their own experimentation and observation and 
opinions based on their own work without first showing general acceptance.  
Id. at 123 (quoting State v. Hummert, 933 P.2d 1187, 1195). The Logerquist opinion 
was the subject of an issue of the Arizona State Law Journal. See Margaret A. Berger, 
When is Clinical Psychology Like Astrology?, 33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 75 (2001); David L. 
Faigman, Embracing the Darkness: Logerquist v. McVey and the Doctrine of Ignorance 
of Science Is an Excuse, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 91 (2001); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific 
Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 103 (2001); Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, Logerquist v. McVey: The Majority’s Flawed Procedural Assumptions, 33 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121 (2001). 
 39 A few Daubert opinions have come close. For example, in Emig. v. 
Electrolux Home Products, Inc., the court said:  
“It is not appropriate to invoke the Daubert test in cases where expert 
testimony is based solely on experience or training, as opposed to a 
methodology or technique.” Indeed, where the expert’s opinion is based on 
“years of accumulated learning and insight,” the reliability of such opinion 
“should be assessed without resort to the Daubert factors.”  
No. 06-CV-4791, 2008 WL 4200988, at *7 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 11, 2008) (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 949 F. Supp. 171, 177-78 (S.D.N.Y.1996)). 
 40 See 3 FAIGMAN, ET AL., supra note 35, at § 21:7. See, e.g., Whiting v. Boston 
Edison, Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 23 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[Plaintiff’s experts] propound the 
argument that . . . because Gary Whiting was exposed to radiation before he contracted 
[acute lymphocytic leukemia], his ALL must have been caused by radiation exposure. 
This is a classic illustration of the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc.”); Schmaltz 
v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“It is well 
settled that a causation opinion based solely on a temporal relationship is not derived 
from the scientific method and is therefore insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
Fed. R. Evid. 702.”). 
  There are a handful of cases that balk at even this limitation. See 
Kannankeril v. Terminis International, Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3d Cir. 1997).  
 41 Even some of the temporal order cases are, at bottom, about general 
causation. See Ervin v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 492 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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other possible causes. Experts who fail to consider alternatives 
are often excluded.42 
If, however, experts do avoid these two obvious 
inadequacies, their testimony is rarely excluded. When doctors 
employ standard diagnostic techniques many courts are likely 
to admit their differential diagnosis testimony. The classic 
statement of this position comes from the In re Paoli opinion: 
“to the extent that a doctor utilizes standard diagnostic 
techniques in gathering . . . this information, the more likely 
we are to find that the doctor’s methodology is reliable.”43 
Moreover, most courts would agree with Paoli that a failure to 
account for all possible causes does not render expert opinion 
based on differential diagnosis inadmissible.44 
John’s Heating Service v. Lamb,45 is a state court opinion 
supporting this position: 
Of course, “[a] differential diagnosis that fails to take serious account 
of other potential causes may be so lacking that it cannot provide a 
reliable basis for an opinion on causation.” But here that is not the 
case. Here, doctors experienced with carbon monoxide exposure 
performed the differential diagnosis, which included making 
physical examinations, taking medical history, and reviewing 
clinical tests. In addition, the diagnosis was bolstered by a temporal 
relationship between the symptoms and the possible carbon 
monoxide exposure and the discrepancy between Cynthia’s 
performance and verbal IQs corresponding almost uniquely to 
carbon monoxide poisoning. An expert’s causation conclusion should 
not be excluded because she has not ruled out every possible 
alternative; rather, existing possible alternatives should affect the 
weight that the jury gives the experts’ testimony.46 
  
 42 See Terry v. Ottawa Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental 
Delay, 658, 847 N.E.2d 1246 (Oh. Ct. App. 2006) (“We agree with the trial court: Dr. 
Bernstein did not conduct a scientifically valid differential diagnosis, because his 
method relied primarily upon temporal relationships and because he did not rule out 
other possible causes. He was properly barred from testifying to specific causation.”); 
see also Roche v. Lincoln Property Co., 278 F.Supp.2d 744 (E.D. Va. 2003) (Plaintiff’s 
expert’s testimony that mold caused the plaintiffs’ allergy-like symptoms excluded in 
part because he failed “to rule out the Roches’ significant allergies to cats, dust mites, 
grasses, weeds, and trees as potential causes for the Roches’ symptoms.” Mrs. Roche 
had been to the emergency room on several occasions with similar symptoms prior to 
moving to the defendant’s apartment.).  
 43 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 44 See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265-66 (4th Cir. 
1999); Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 45 John’s Heating Service v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024 (Alaska 2002). 
 46 John’s Heating Service v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024, 1036 (Alaska 2002) 
(internal citation omitted); see also Asad v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 
726 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Perkins v. Origin Medsystems, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D. Conn. 
2004); Yarchak v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d 470, 498 (D.N.J. 2002); Keener v. 
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The process of ruling out other causes is relatively easy 
when there is a unique connection between an exposure and a 
disease (a so-called signature disease)47 or, as in John’s 
Heating, when there is a unique connection between an 
exposure and a particular set of symptoms. The task becomes 
more difficult when various causes do not produce 
demonstrable differences in the disease. 
The task becomes even more difficult when the causes of 
the type of injury under investigation are not well understood. 
When the etiology of an illness is not well understood, there 
will be many idiopathic injuries. This raises an important 
general point. Should courts permit experts to present 
differential diagnosis testimony when the clear weight of 
scientific evidence points to the fact that the substantial 
majority of certain types of injuries are from unknown causes? 
Logically, when this situation arises the best differential 
diagnosis would be legally insufficient. For example, if, with 
respect to some injury, we know that 5% of the cases are 
caused by an exposure to a drug, 5% are caused by another 
known cause, and 90% have no known cause, then even if a 
differential diagnosis clearly excludes the other known cause it 
remains the case that it is much more likely than not that the 
cause in any individual case is not the drug. 
Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc.,48 apparently 
adopted this line of argument. Doe is one of a number of cases 
involving the question of whether exposure to the mercury in 
thimerosal, a preservative once used in vaccines and other 
biologic products, is capable of causing autism in children.49 
After excluding the plaintiff’s causal expert on general 
causation grounds, the court made the following observation: 
More troubling, however, is that Dr. Geier’s differential diagnosis 
failed to acknowledge the one conclusion that is generally accepted 
in the medical community with respect to the causation of autism, 
which is, that its cause is genetic, but that the exact genetic 
sequence of autism is unknown. . . . Although Dr. Geier apparently 
  
Mid-Continent Cas., 817 So. 2d 347 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2002), writ denied, 825 So. 2d 
1175 (La. 2002). 
  As the John’s Heating quote indicates, many factors may enter into a 
differential diagnosis, including individual and family history, genetic predispositions, 
exposure to other known causes, and the results of various tests.  
 47 This is the situation with respect to asbestos exposure and mesothelioma. 
 48 Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 465, 477-78 (M.D. 
N.C. 2006). 
 49 See Snyder ex rel. Snyder v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 88 Fed. Cl. 
706, 711 (2009); Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 158, 163 (2009). 
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has considered a number of specific genetic disorders in performing 
his differential diagnosis, the Court finds that his failure to take into 
account the existence of such a strong likelihood of a currently 
unknown genetic cause of autism serves to negate Dr. Geier’s use of 
the differential diagnosis technique as being proper in this instance.50 
What is interesting about Doe is that its position is quite rare. 
Courts do not generally rule against the admissibility of a 
differential diagnosis on these grounds and note that even in 
Doe the passage was a bit of an afterthought, perhaps even 
dicta. Recall, the court had already concluded that the plaintiff 
could not prevail on general causation.  
In sum, the high exclusion rate in toxic torts disguises 
the fact that these cases address two separate issues, general 
and specific causation. With respect to general causation, the 
courts rely heavily on the available science to exclude expert 
testimony. However, with respect to specific causation, courts 
are, on balance, much more lenient. If an expert follows normal 
procedures, i.e., collects a medical history of the patient and the 
patient’s family, conducts appropriate laboratory and 
diagnostic tests, and gives consideration to other causes, and if 
there is no a glaring alternative cause that seems far more 
likely to have caused the illness,51 courts are likely to admit 
differential diagnosis testimony even though there simply are no 
tests one can perform that will produce a quantified estimate as 
to whether an injury is the result of one cause or another.52  
IV. ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS IN FORENSIC CASES 
Prior to Daubert, the Frye “general acceptance” test was 
used primarily in criminal cases.53 Courts excluded proffered 
  
 50 Ortho-Clinical, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (internal citations omitted). 
 51 See Newton v. Roche Laboratories, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Tex. 2002). 
 52 Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to 
the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 209-10 (1992) (“Scientists know very 
little about how, in a mechanistic sense, toxic substances cause disease such as cancer 
or birth defects.”). 
 53 Indeed, nearly all Frye admissibility rulings that excluded expert 
testimony were in the criminal area. Federal civil cases in which the Frye test was 
employed to exclude testimony are extraordinarily rare. Kenneth Chesebro, Galileo’s 
Retort, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1695 (1993) reports there were only two federal 
appellate court opinions excluding civil evidence on Frye grounds prior to the lower 
court Daubert decision. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 
(5th Cir. 1991) (employing Frye to determine that district court was within its 
discretion to exclude medical expert’s testimony in civil case where that testimony was 
not generally accepted within relevant scientific community), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1280 (1991) (using Frye to exclude epidemiological re-analysis studies in civil suit); 
Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 
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expert testimony in a few areas. The inadmissibility of lie 
detector results is the most well known example.54 With respect 
to most areas of forensic evidence, however, the courts 
concluded that expert testimony met the general acceptance 
standard.55 As pointed out by Paul Giannelli, the courts arrived 
at this result by defining the relevant field of expertise as the 
very group of individuals, e.g., handwriting analysts, whose 
expertise was being judged.56 Unsurprisingly, this group 
vouched for its own endeavor.57 Admissibility rulings did not 
concern themselves with the quality of the evidence. 
Daubert offered an opportunity to revisit these 
admissibility decisions but by and large the pattern of liberal 
admissibility decisions has not changed. Although federal 
courts and state courts in jurisdictions that have adopted 
Daubert often pay lip-service to that test, it is rarely used to 
exclude forensic evidence experts.58 
There are, undoubtedly, many reasons why courts apply 
liberal standards when considering forensic evidence.59 
However, I believe an important factor is the same one that 
leads to liberal admissibility rulings in toxic tort, specific 
causation determinations. There is very little hard scientific 
evidence upon which to base opinions. As a consequence, 
similar to the specific causation situation, the courts rely on 
  
1984) (employing Frye to overturn district court’s admission of type of “voice stress 
analysis” in civil diversity case involving insurance claim, but failing to consider 
propriety of imposing Frye in civil case). 
 54 See 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 35. 
 55 See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 1:35.  
 56 Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). 
 57 Id. at 1203.  
 58 For examples of this reluctance to apply Daubert factors, see 4 FAIGMAN ET 
AL., supra note 35, at § 32 (fingerprint identification), § 33 (handwriting identification), 
§ 36 (bitemark identification). 
 59 They include: a) bias in favor of the state in criminal prosecutions, b) the 
quality of criminal defense attorney and their limited resources, c) the negative effects 
on judges if they refuse to permit the state to present its experts (a consideration that 
may be particularly relevant to elected judges, d) the long history of admissibility of 
forensic evidence which creates its own inertia to keep things the way they have 
always been, and e) judicial belief of the claims of forensic experts. For a very useful 
discussion of why lower courts may actually believe forensic experts despite the limited 
empirical evidence supporting some of their claims, see Michael J. Saks, Explaining the 
Tension Between the Supreme Court’s Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts’ (Seeming) Rejection of Same, 3 
EPISTEME 329 (2008). 
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expert testimony that is not much more than a clinical 
judgment from an experience based expert.60 
Before I expand on this point, I should be clear on 
another. I do not mean to suggest that the causal issue in the 
forensic context is exactly the same as the issue in toxic torts. 
Within the context of forensic experts, the distinction between 
general and specific causation is rarely, if ever made. We 
simply do not think about forensic evidence in that way. Indeed, 
the terms “general causation” and “specific causation” seem to be 
terms of art that are restricted to the toxic tort context.  
Nevertheless, one can think of forensic evidence in these 
terms. From one point of view, the connection between general 
causation and specific causation is easier in forensic cases. The 
problem in toxic torts is to determine which of several things 
caused the plaintiff’s disease. This problem does not exist in 
forensics. Latent fingerprints are “caused” by fingers, not some 
other source. In the jargon of toxic torts, latent prints are a 
“signature disease” cause by human fingers. This is true of 
even the most suspect forms of forensic evidence, e.g., bite 
marks. It is, in fact, the existence of this relationship that gives 
much forensic evidence testimony its initial plausibility. 
Another, perhaps more useful way to compare the 
causal question in toxic tort and forensic cases is to think of 
each individual as a source of many latent prints. That person 
is, in the jargon of toxic torts, an entity that is a “general 
cause” of some prints. The individual problem is determining 
whether this person, rather than all the other plausible sources 
of the print, is the “cause” of a particular print.61 From this 
  
 60 See Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic 
Knowledge Claims in the Post-Daubert Era, 43 TULSA L. REV. 263, 276 (2007); Lyn 
Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Experiential or Scientific Expertise, 7 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 143 (2008). 
 61 From this point of view, the forensic evidence problem is similar to the 
problem that arises in tort when we have an indeterminate defendant. This issue was 
brought into starkest relief in the DES cases. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 
Cal.3d 588, 601 (1980). In those cases, through no fault of their own, the plaintiffs 
could not identify which drug company manufactured the drug sold to their mothers 
many years earlier. In the Sindell case the court solved the plaintiff’s proof problem by 
forcing defendants to prove that they did not sell the prescription or be liable for a 
share of the plaintiff’s injury based on each defendant’s market share of sales of DES in 
the relevant market. This solution has rarely escaped the narrow confines of the DES 
cases, and generally a plaintiff simply cannot prevail in this circumstance. Id.  
  A related problem arises when many defendants contributed some part of 
the total dose of a harmful substance that caused the plaintiff’s injury. This issue 
arises in asbestos cases. One solution is to ask the jury to assign liability to each 
defendant based on the percentage of the total risk of injury generated by that 
defendant’s product. Thus, if a defendant made 10 percent of the total asbestos to 
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perspective, the individual causation questions are parallel. 
Can we detect which agent caused a disease by looking at a 
patient’s illness? Can we detect which finger left a print by 
looking at the latent print? 
In both areas, the accuracy with which we can make 
this judgment turns on the quality and quantity of our general 
understanding of a phenomenon and our ability to translate 
this knowledge to a judgment about the individual case. In the 
forensics arena, as in the toxic tort arena, the courts must try 
to answer a question without the benefit of much underlying 
general scientific knowledge. The problem in toxic torts is that 
the base rate information supplied by epidemiological research 
and, to a lesser extent, animal studies, is not easily translated 
into information about causation in the particular case. The 
problem in most forensics situations is in one sense more 
fundamental: with the exception of DNA testing, there is very little 
base rate information at all. In the next few paragraphs, I illustrate 
the problem using the example of fingerprint identification.62 
A. Fingerprint Identification 
The primary method used to examine fingerprints in the 
United States is called ACE-V, an acronym which stands for 
the stages of the examination: Analysis-Comparison-
Evaluation-Verification.63 As described by Haber and Haber,64 
the ACE-V examination proceeds as follows. 
At the Analysis Stage, “the fingerprint examiner looks 
at a latent fingerprint and decides whether it contains 
sufficient quantity and quality of detail so that it exceeds the 
  
which the plaintiff was exposed, it would ideally be assigned 10 percent of the liability. 
See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953, 957 (1997). 
  It is important to note that in both the Sindell and the Rutherford 
situations the courts are prepared to adopt this solution only in the cases where every 
one of the defendants has breached a duty to the plaintiff. Obviously, this is never the 
situation in criminal cases. One potential defendant “breached a duty” to the plaintiff, 
but all the other potential defendants are innocent. 
  On rare occasions, one might have a specific causation issue in forensics 
which is similar to that in toxic torts. For example, a case might arise where the 
question was whether a bite mark was caused by human or animal teeth.  
 62 I chose fingerprint identification because it is an area of forensics with 
high face validity. If a problem exists here, a fortiori, it exists in other areas such as 
handwriting analysis.  
 63 Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint 
Evidence Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 87, 87 (2008). 
 64 Id.  
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standard for value.”65 If it does not, no further steps are possible 
and the prints are rejected.66 
If a latent print does meet the value standard, the 
examiner collects as much evidence as possible on “the nature 
of the surface on which [the print] was deposited, the amount 
and direction of pressure used in touch[ing the surface, and the 
way] . . . in which the ridge details of the [print] were transferred 
onto the surface,” e.g., sweat.67 All of this is employed in the next 
step to account for inevitable distortions between the latent print 
and the print against which it is being compared.68 
For prints that do meet the value standard, the 
examiner chooses a feature-rich area of the latent print.69 
“Within this area, he selects the particular features along the 
various ridge paths in the latent print, in their spatial locations 
relative to one another . . . .”70  
In the Comparison Stage, the examiner attempts to 
ascertain whether one of the suspects’ fingers made the latent 
print by comparing the same area that he chose for the latent 
print.71 Failure to find a correspondence that cannot be 
accounted for by factors such as distortion lead to an exclusion 
of that finger.72 This, of course, is the most likely result. If there 
are sufficient points of similarity and no excluding differences, 
the examiner will return to the latent print, examine another 
area of the latent print, and then again compare this area to 
the exemplar print.73 This process will be repeated until “all the 
features of the latent print have been compared.”74 If there are 
sufficient points of comparison and no excluding differences, 
the examiner proceeds to the Evaluation Stage.75  
“In [the Evaluation Stage], the examiner applies a 
sufficiency standard to the amount of corresponding agreement 
between the latent and the exemplar [print].”76 “If the amount 
of corresponding agreement exceeds the sufficiency standard, 
  
 65 Id. at 90 (emphasis omitted). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 90. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 90-91. 
 73 Id. at 91. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 91. 
 76 Id. 
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then the examiner concludes that the crime scene latent print 
[was made by the suspect finger].”77 (In the language of latent 
print examiners, “the crime scene latent print can be 
individuated to the suspect.”)78 “If the amount of agreement 
does not reach th[is] standard,” the examiner may say the 
comparison is inconclusive.79 This sufficiency standard can be 
numeric, i.e., there are X number of points of similarity 
between the latent print and the exemplar.80 Or, the standard 
can be experiential, “based on the individual examiner’s 
training and experience.”81 Fingerprint examiners in the United 
States rarely use a numeric standard.82 
In the Verification Stage, which is done in larger 
laboratories, after an examiner has concluded that the latent 
print did come from a suspect finger, a second examiner 
confirms or disconfirms the conclusion.83 The verification is not 
a complete re-analysis, but rather is a review of the evidence 
and the conclusions of the examiner.84 
As cautious and thorough as this sounds, apparently 
there is no peer-reviewed study testing the validity of the ACE-
V method.85 Indeed, such a study would be difficult to conduct 
because the details of how an examiner is to proceed are left 
quite open ended.86 As a consequence, here is what a recent 
National Academy of Science (the “National Academy”) report 
on the state of forensic evidence has to say about ACE-V. 
[T]he assessment of latent prints from crime scenes is based largely 
on human interpretation. Note that the ACE-V method does not 
specify particular measurements or a standard test protocol, and 
examiners must make subjective assessments throughout. In the 
United States, the threshold for making a source identification is 
deliberately kept subjective, so that the examiner can take into 
account both the quantity and quality of comparable details. As a 
  
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 91. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 91. 
 82 Id. at 102. 
 83 Id. at 91. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 95. 
 86 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 139 (2009). 
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result, the outcome of a friction ridge analysis is not necessarily 
repeatable from examiner to examiner . . . .87 
This subjectivity is intrinsic to friction ridge analysis, as can be seen 
when comparing it with DNA analysis. For the latter, 13 specific 
segments of DNA (generally) are compared for each of two DNA 
samples. Each of these segments consists of ordered sequences of the 
base pairs, called A, G, C, and T. Studies have been conducted to 
determine the range of variation in the sequence of base pairs at 
each of the 13 loci and also to determine how much variation exists 
in different populations. From these data, scientists can calculate 
the probability that two DNA samples from different people will 
have the same permutations at each of the 13 loci. 
By contrast, before examining two fingerprints, one cannot say a 
priori which features should be compared. Features are selected 
during the comparison phase of ACE-V, when a fingerprint examiner 
identifies which features are common the two impressions and are 
clear enough to be evaluated. Because a feature that was helpful 
during a previous comparison might not exist on these prints or 
might not have been captured in the latent impression, the process 
does not allow one to stipulate specific measurements in advance, as 
is done for a DNA analysis. Moreover, a small stretching of distance 
between two fingerprint features, or a twisting of angles, can result 
from either a difference between the fingers that left the prints or 
from distortions from the impression process. For these reasons, 
population statistics for fingerprints have not been developed and 
friction ridge analysis relies on subjective judgments by the 
examiner. Little research has been directed toward developing 
population statistics, although more would be feasible.88  
As the National Academy report notes, population 
statistics are a perquisite to fully quantifying the diagnosticity 
of an observed set of fingerprint characteristics. If the 
characteristics are rare, then a reported match is more 
diagnostic of the claim that two prints came from a common 
source.89 For example, in DNA testing, the random match 
probability, i.e., the frequency with which a genetic profile 
exists in the population, captures the diagnosticity of a match.  
Developing population statistics for fingerprints will not 
be an easy task. We do not have a “map” of fingerprints in the 
same sense that we have a map of the human genome. Thus, 
  
 87 Id. at 139-40. The report cites recent research that suggests even 
“experienced examiners do not necessarily agree with even their own past conclusions 
when the task is presented in a different context” at a later time. See id. (citing Itiel E. 
Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600 
(2006)). 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Jonathan J. Koehler, Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: 
What They Are and Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1078 (2008). 
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we do not know the frequency of different patterns in the way 
that we know the variations in the sequencing of base pairs in 
specific loci. Nor do we have strong evidence of the 
independence of patterns.90 
Even if we were to have such base rate information, we 
would find it to be of less practical use than it is in DNA 
testing. In most cases, DNA matches are made with sufficient 
DNA that we can make comparisons at multiple locations.91 The 
DNA samples contain complete or nearly complete information 
about the sequences of base pairs at multiple loci. 
Metaphorically, the samples are nearly “perfect prints.” The 
problem in the real world of fingerprint identification arises 
when the latent print is far, far from perfect. The impression 
left by a given finger will differ every time because of 
variations in pressure and the impression medium.  
Given this reality, the National Academy report 
proposes some other steps that could be taken to move the area 
toward a sounder scientific footing.92 For example, the field 
could conduct research on the variables that effect latent print 
differences.93 Note that these steps are designed to improve our 
general understanding of fingerprint marks, a general 
causation-like issue. Even more helpful in the short run would 
  
 90 Independence means that the sequence of base pairs at one location is 
independent of the sequence at another location. When independence exists, one can 
use the product rule to determine the overall probability of a match. Thus if a 
particular sequence at location one occurs in 5% of the population and a particular 
sequence at location two occurs in 10% of the population, the probability of observing 
the same sequence at both loci is 5% times 10% or 0.5%. In the early years of DNA 
testing it was not clear that the independence assumption was valid, causing some to 
propose a more conservative rule when combining probabilities. See Richard Lempert, 
DNA, Science and the Law: Two Cheers for the Ceiling Principle, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 41, 
42-43 (1993). 
 91 The widespread adoption of Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test 
protocols has greatly reduced the occasion where the sample quantity of DNA is 
insufficient for a proper analysis. See 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 30:44. 
 92 Some efforts have been made to examine the ability of automated 
fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) to identify the source of simulated latent 
prints. See Simon Cole et al., Beyond the Individuality of Fingerprints: A Measure of 
Simulated Computer Latent Print Source Attribution Accuracy, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & 
RISK 165, 170 (2008). Insofar as it reduces the role of subjective judgment, there is 
much to be said for this approach. See Itiel E. Dror & Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Use of 
Technology in Human Expert Domains: Challenges and Risks Arising from the Use of 
Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensics, LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 4, available at http://lpr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/ 
reprint/mgp031v1.pdf); David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology and Other 
Abject Lessons from the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 980 (2008). 
 93 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 105-06. 
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be research on reliability.94 The most frequently suggested way 
to achieve better reliability estimates is to engage in serious 
proficiency testing. Such testing would provide a better 
estimate of the error rate (the frequency of false positives and 
false negatives) associated with reported matches.95  
Some fingerprint identification proficiency tests have 
occurred, but they have not used rigorous double blind 
methodology and most observers agree that the tests have not 
involved challenging partial prints.96 Nearly everyone agrees 
that reliability is very high when the examination involves 
good-quality impressions of all ten fingers.97 The critical 
question is how far we can move from this best-case situation 
before identification accuracy begins to deteriorate. Proficiency 
tests employing challenging partials address this question. 
Without some studies along these lines we are unable to assess the 
reliability of expert assertions in different identification settings.98  
Most courts have not been sensitive to the importance of 
distinguishing among different identification situations. With 
very, very few exceptions, they have admitted fingerprint 
identifications.99 Courts have refused to conduct Daubert 
hearings,100 have implicitly reversed the burden of persuasion to 
require the defendant to demonstrate that a fingerprint 
  
 94 The reliability of a reported match addresses the issue of whether two 
reportedly matching prints actually do share a set of common characteristics. Is the 
match a true match, or has the examiner made an error? See Koehler, supra note 89, at 
1078 (citing Suzanne O. Kaasa et al., Statistical Inference and Forensic Evidence: 
Evaluating a Bullet Lead Match, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2007)). 
 95 Under such a scheme, examiners would be sent prints to be analyzed. The 
examiner would not know that the prints were part of a proficiency test and the examiner 
would not be provided other evidence of a suspect’s guilt or innocence. Such double blind 
testing is standard practice in other areas such as clinical trials for new drugs. 
 96 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: 
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 135 (2008) 
(quoting a Scotland Yard fingerprint expert testifying in Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 
2d 549, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).  
 97 See Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert 
Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 15, 68-69 (2004). 
 98 See Cole, supra note 37, at 273. 
 99 For a thorough discussion of the post-Daubert case law on the admissibility 
of fingerprint evidence, see 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at §§ 33:3-:19. The 
following paragraph borrows heavily from this discussion. Although the following 
discussion focuses on federal court opinions, the states generally replicate this pattern. 
See id. at § 33:19.  
 100 See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, No. CR. A. 99-238, 2001 WL 515213, at 
*1 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001); United States v. Ambriz-Vasquez, 34 Fed. Appx. 356, 359 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
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identification is not reliable,101 have refused to focus on the 
“task at hand” as required by Kumho Tire,102 have refused to 
conduct an assessment of the evidence on fingerprint 
reliability,103 have admitted expert testimony by relying on the 
fact that other courts have admitted the testimony,104 have 
relegated any concerns about validity to weight, not 
admissibility,105 and in general have lowered the bar to the level 
necessary to admit fingerprint identification.106  
The story is the same with respect to many other types 
of forensic evidence. Courts often seem to simply mouth the 
Daubert criteria without actually assessing whether the 
proffered evidence meets these criteria.107 In sum, the critique of 
judicial leniency toward forensic experts is well founded. But is 
it any more lenient than proof of specific causation in toxic tort 
cases? The next section compares the two areas. 
  
 101 United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171, 173 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 102 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 33:6. 
 103 United States v. Havvard, 117 F.Supp.2d 848, 855 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 
260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 104 Havvard, 260 F.3d at 600; United States v. Frias, No. 01 Cr. 307, 2003 WL 
352502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2003). 
 105 United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (D. Kan. 2002), aff’d, 
349 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 106 Id. A rare exception to this landslide of opinions admitting fingerprint 
evidence was United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
However, Judge Pollak later withdrew his initial opinion excluding fingerprint 
evidence and admitted the evidence. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 
(E.D. Pa. 2002); see also United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(Michael, J., dissenting). 
 107 Faigman, supra note 8, at 718; see also Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 
S.W.3d 258, 260-64 (Ky. 1999). For a discussion of Johnson, see Michael J. Saks, 
Protecting Factfinders From Being Overly Misled, While Still Admitting Weakly 
Supported Forensic Science into Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 609 (2007): 
In a challenge to the admissibility of microscopic hair identification evidence, 
the Kentucky Supreme Court purported to be conducting an analysis under 
that state’s version of Daubert. The record was devoid of research studies on 
the validity of asserted microscopic hair identification expertise, so the Court 
relied entirely on the “general acceptance” criterion of Daubert. But there was 
no evidence of that in the record either. So the Court turned to its own earlier 
(pre-Daubert) Kentucky decisions in search of general acceptance of 
microscopic hair comparison. But not one of the earlier cases admitting 
testimony on hair identification said a word about general acceptance of the 
technique. So the Court stated that it would assume that those earlier 
decisions must have: addressed the question, conducted an appropriate 
inquiry, and found general acceptance. How else could they have admitted 
the testimony?  
Id. at 619-20. In point of fact, the Frye test had not been adopted or even mentioned in 
Kentucky cases until after those cases were decided. As Saks notes, “this Court had to 
create out of thin air the basis for admission under the weakest of the Daubert prongs.” 
Id. at 620. 
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V. COMPARING TOXIC TORT AND FORENSIC ADMISSIBILITY 
STANDARDS 
I do not wish to argue that there are no differences in 
admissibility standards in toxic tort cases and in admissibility 
standards in forensic cases. There are. Many tort plaintiffs lose 
their lawsuit at the summary judgment stage after the court 
has excluded their causation experts. Only very rarely does the 
same fate befall the state in criminal prosecutions.108 However, 
the differences disguise an underlying similarity that is 
revealed once we control for the quantity and quality of the 
scientific evidence available to address various causal 
questions. Plaintiff experts are excluded in toxic tort cases 
largely because of an inability to show general causation, 
something about which there is often a body of empirical 
evidence. However, when there is relatively little evidence, 
which occurs most frequently with respect to proof of specific 
causation, the courts set a threshold that is not much higher 
than that required in the forensic area to prove a particular 
defendant left some piece of trace evidence at a crime scene.  
This does not mean that experts who testify about 
individual causation always have little or no support for the 
position they espouse. Quite frequently, they do. The point is 
well made by Professor Mnookin with respect to fingerprint 
evidence.  
[T]he reality is that there are plenty of cases where the totality of the 
evidence—including but not limited to a fingerprint identification—
leaves little practical doubt about ground truth. Fingerprint 
identification’s 100 years of use in a variety of contexts does not come 
close to answering all the questions about precisely how accurate it is, 
or how commonly identification errors are made, but it does provide 
some degree of prima facie evidence of its general validity.109 
The same may be said for many differential diagnoses. Often 
the probabilistic evidence that a particular substance caused a 
particular illness may be very high and we can state with 
substantial certainty that one caused the other even in the 
absence of a mechanistic understanding of how this occurs.110  
  
 108 Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining 
“Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 322 (2000). 
 109 See Mnookin, supra note 96, at 134. 
 110 I certainly do not mean to suggest that such probabilistic evidence is never 
a sufficient substitute for a mechanistic understanding. This argument is similar to the 
cigarette industry’s long standing argument that the causal link between tobacco usage 
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The point is not that all such testimony is unreliable 
(although in certain areas such as bite marks, a large 
percentage of the testimony may be of very low validity). 
Rather, the point is that the threshold for admissibility is low 
and, in part, this is a judicial response to the fact that there is 
little useful quantified empirical evidence courts may employ to 
establish a higher admissibility baseline.111 
  
and lung cancer was not established because we did not understand the exact way in 
which tobacco smoke caused cancer. In the case of cigarettes, where the relative risk of 
lung cancer among serious smokers is approximately five-fold that of non smokers, 
neither common sense nor law requires mechanistic causation to assert that more likely 
than not any particular lung cancer of a long-time smoker was caused by their habit.  
 111 In the absence of direct empirical evidence, following a set routine and 
expressing conclusions in a formulistic way takes on increased importance. In the toxic 
tort arena, the best differential diagnoses involve factors such as: a patient 
examination and patient history, diagnostic tests, laboratory tests, tissue samples and 
biopsies, and genetic testing. See 3 FAIGMAN, ET AL., supra note 35, § 21:31-:39. Failure 
to structure one’s testimony along these lines or a failure verbally to give full 
consideration to all of the data may lead to the exclusion of the expert’s testimony. See, 
e.g., Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 2001); Viterbo v. Dow 
Chem. Co. 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987).  
  Likewise, fingerprint expertise may be rejected if the state makes no effort 
to explain and justify an examiner’s conclusion. See Jacobs v. Gov’t of the Virgin 
Islands, 53 Fed. Appx. 651 (3d Cir. 2002). The recent emergence of the ACE-V 
terminology for fingerprint analysis may be understood from this perspective. Professor 
Cole notes that the terminology was first adopted after the Daubert opinion. “Given the 
fortuitous timing, one might suspect that the term was adopted in the wake of Daubert 
to lend forensic fingerprint identification a scientific patina.” Simon A. Cole, 
Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings From Jennings to Llera-
Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1236 n.201 (2004). 
  Wrapping testimony in the rhetoric of a methodology does not, of course, 
make it more reliable. As Professor Cole notes with respect to ACE-V, “[I]t indicates 
little more than looking at two objects and determining, subjectively, whether they 
originate from a common source, and then repeating this process.” Id.  
  Professor Mnookin argues that courts should not settle for explanations of 
method standing alone. 
Indeed, the history of the identification sciences in court shows a repeated 
and dangerous pattern: when judges are provided with an intuitively 
appealing description of a science of ‘matching,’ they frequently let poorly 
specified explanations of method substitute for a more searching assessment 
of validity and reliability . . . . 
Judges, therefore, would be well advised to focus on the degree of testing 
associated with the claims made by experts rather than emphasizing whether 
the expert has offered a seemingly plausible explanation of her technique and 
her conclusion. 
Jennifer Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the Validity of 
Forensic Science, 5 EPISTEME 343, 349-51 (2008). 
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VI. CONTEXTUALISM AND THE LAW’S APPROACH TO 
INDIVIDUAL CAUSATION 
Many critics of the lax admissibility standards in 
forensic cases call upon the courts to tighten things up. At the 
same time, some call upon courts to ease admissibility 
standards in civil cases. A first reaction to these two requests 
might be that the courts should search for one appropriate 
standard that applies to all admissibility questions. A single 
standard might be epistemologically more satisfying, but given 
the social objectives of the law, in my opinion, it would be ill 
advised. A brief discussion of the standard epistemological 
approach to knowledge will help us to see why this is the case. 
The standard approach to the question of “when . . . it is 
proper to say someone knows something . . . involves the 
interplay of three primary variables: belief, truth, and 
justification.”112 Belief is a person’s subjective position concerning 
the truth of a proposition. Truth is the reality of the proposition 
independent of belief. Justification involves the quality of the 
reasons for a belief. To count as knowledge, something must be 
believed to be true, it must be true, and a person’s belief that it 
is true must be justified. In the absence of belief, we have 
ignorance. In the absence of truth, we have error. In the absence 
of appropriate justification, we have mere opinion.113 What is 
most noteworthy about this standard approach is that its main 
concern is not knowledge per se but justification. Even correct 
beliefs without justification are not knowledge. 
For courts, the relevant question is what level of 
justification should be required before experts are permitted to 
testify? Clearly, the level must be sufficient to qualify the 
person as an expert, i.e., in the jargon of evidence law, a person 
must be in possession of knowledge (and justification for that 
knowledge) that is beyond the ken of the lay person. But 
beyond that, how much? Presumably, a single admissibility 
standard would require the same level of justification from all 
experts. But from where would such a standard come? 
Earlier in the article, I compared legal and scientific 
conventions. I noted that three relevant scientific conventions 
  
 112 D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and 
Leviathan: Law Enforcement-Sponsored Research and the Criminal Process, 2003 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1023, 1024. 
 113 MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 
TO EPISTEMOLOGY 16-19 (2001). 
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are: a) a search for general and theoretical propositions, b) 
doing so by employing the methods and techniques accepted by 
one’s field, and c) an attitude of agnosticism that encourages a 
wait-and-see attitude. I compared these to the relevant legal 
conventions which: a) often focus on the specific event, and b) 
push witnesses toward arriving at a conclusion.  
The point I wish to make here is that the second 
element in scientific conventions, a commitment to the methods 
and techniques of inquiry accepted by one’s field, has no direct 
parallel in legal conventions. Of course, the law has 
conventional techniques it uses to arrive at causal conclusions. 
Substantial parts of the law of evidence could be understood in 
this way. But ultimately when it comes to methods and 
techniques of acquiring knowledge in the first instance, the law 
has no methodology of its own. It simply borrows the relevant 
scientific methodology. Presumably, the law could be 
indifferent to the methods and techniques used by an 
investigator or even ask the investigator to forego these 
techniques when appearing in court. However, most post-
Daubert courts are respectful of these methods. Many 
successful Daubert challenges turn on the argument that the 
expert failed to use the methods deemed to be appropriate by 
those in his field when arriving at a causal conclusion.114  
Even if the courts were inclined to establish a single 
level of justification for causal assertions, what should it be? In 
some situations, raising the bar may systematically guarantee 
victory for one side, a result many courts find to be undesirable 
as a general principle.115 If raising the bar has problems, how 
about lowering the bar? This does not lead inevitably to a 
victory for one side, but it has its own problems. If experts are 
not to use their normal methods for determining causation, 
what are they to use? Because the question has no obvious 
  
 114 One need look no further than Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137 (1999). Referring to the plaintiff’s expert, the court said, “Indeed, no one has 
argued that Carlson himself, were he still working for Michelin, would have concluded 
in a report to his employer that a similar tire was similarly defective on grounds 
identical to those upon which he rested his conclusion here.” Id. at 157.  
 115 In the toxic tort area, opinions that require the plaintiff to have 
epidemiological evidence in order to prove causation note that this is not always 
necessary. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 718 (1997). One 
suspects that a similar concern underlies many lenient forensic opinions. The court 
may fear that raising the bar too high would make it impossible for the state to prove 
its case in many criminal trials.  
1394 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
answer, courts are also reluctant to adopt this position.116 
Where does this leave us?  
The epistemological approaches most congenial to the 
standard legal position on what constitutes adequate 
justification are contextual approaches to knowledge.117 The 
central idea behind contextualism is that the standards for 
making knowledge attributions vary depending on the context 
within which they are made.118 The rules of evidence are applied 
in a way that is consistent with the contextualist’s 
fundamental observation that the level of justification we 
require for something to count as knowledge and coincidently 
for someone to be epistemically responsible in asserting a 
  
 116 I attended a Court of Federal Claims conference in November of 2008. One of 
the panels was on compensation under the National Vaccine Act. The central topic of the 
panel was proof of causation under the Act. A number of attorneys from the petitioners’ 
bar argued for a relaxed standard of causation that would be different from “scientific” 
causation. Those in favor of this position argued that a medical theory combined with 
temporal order should be sufficient to prove causation. If one suffered an injury shortly 
after being vaccinated and some theory supported a causal connection then one should 
recover under the Act. In support of this position, the petitioners cited Althen v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., which set forth three criteria for recovery under the Act: (1) 
medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the injury; (2) a logical sequence 
of cause and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for the injury; and (3) a 
proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and injury. 
  In response to this argument, a special master in a thimerosal case before 
the court responded: 
Althen requires more than merely a medical theory. Petitioners must offer a 
biologically plausible medical theory. . . .  
What is missing from petitioners’ formulation of the medical theory 
prong of Althen is the requirement that such a theory be reliable.  
Under the Vaccine Act, a special master may determine the reliability of 
a medical theory by considering the framework established by Daubert. See 
Terran v. Sec’y, HHS, 195 F.3d 1302, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (framework 
established by Daubert for evaluating the reliability of evidence appropriate 
for use by special masters). Daubert requires that an opinion be supported by 
something more than subjective belief; it must be grounded “in the methods 
and procedures of science.” 
Snyder v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 01-162V (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009) (internal 
citations omitted), available at http://www.autism-watch.org/omnibus/snyder.pdf. 
 117 David Lewis, Elusive Knowledge, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 503 
(Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim eds., 2000); Keith DeRose, Solving the Skeptical Problem, 
in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 482 (Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim eds., 2000); 
Michael Williams, Epistemological Realism, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 536 
(Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim eds., 2000). Cranor advocates a similar position in the 
area of regulation. See CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND LAW ch. 5 (1993). 
 118 On the different forms of contextualism, compare Steward Cohen, 
Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery, 
in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 517 (Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim eds., 2000) with 
David Lewis, Elusive Knowledge, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 503. 
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belief, varies according to the context within which the belief is 
held and expressed. Within the confines of the present 
discussion, the most important context is the quantity and 
quality of the available evidence.119 
The contextual nature of legal epistemology is both a 
strength and a weakness. It is a strength because it balances 
two important legal goals. Earlier in the article, when listing 
differences between scientific and legal conventions, I noted 
that the law needs to arrive at a conclusion. A wait-and-see 
attitude that advises us to bide our time until we arrive at a 
greater level of justification for a belief may suffice in science, 
but not in the courtroom. Competing against the goal of 
resolving cases is the goal of arriving at the factually correct 
outcome. As Federal Rule of Evidence 102 states, evidentiary 
rules shall be construed toward the end of ascertaining the 
truth.120 Acquiescing to a low level of justification when in fact 
experts can do better is to insure more incorrect outcomes than 
are necessary. A contextual approach balances these objectives. 
If, as Aquinas teaches us, prudence is the first virtue, 
contextualism is indeed a virtue.121 And as a practical matter 
this approach permits the law to sidestep difficult philosophical 
questions concerning knowledge and get on with the business 
of deciding cases.122 
However, if the contextual approach’s flexibility is its 
strength, it is also its potential weakness. Without more, it 
offers no independent standard by which courts may measure 
the twin problems of epistemological adequacy: when is the 
  
 119 In this article, I do not propose to provide a complete review of the many 
ways in which courts adopt a contextual approach. One example, however, might be in 
order. In the rather well known handwriting analysis, United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 
F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), Judge McKenna was met with a defense challenge that 
the state’s expert should be excluded because there was little or no scientific support for 
the reliability of his alleged expertise. The judge concluded that if the Daubert standard 
were applied, the state’s expert should be excluded. Rather than take this step, the judge 
concluded that Daubert did not apply to “skilled” experts. Here, the key point is that the 
court invents a special category of expert with a special admissibility standard precisely 
because it recognizes that the standard to which experts were held to in Daubert would 
lead to the exclusion of the state’s document examiner. 
 120 FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 121 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE CARDINAL VIRTUES: PRUDENCE, JUSTICE, 
FORTITUDE, AND TEMPERANCE (Richard J Regan, trans., 2005). 
 122 One is reminded of Sir Frederick Pollock’s famous aphorism that “The 
lawyer cannot afford to adventure himself with philosophers in the logical and 
metaphysical controversies that beset the idea of cause.” SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE 
LAW OF TORTS 36 (11th ed. 1920).  
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admissibility bar set too high and, my primary concern in this 
article, when is the bar set too low?123  
The best answer to date, and an answer consistent with 
a contextual approach, has been advanced by Professor Nance124 
and Professor Mnookin.125 Courts should require a level of 
justification that is as good as practicably possible. Assuming 
such a standard is as good as we can do, what does it 
practically mean with respect to individual causation evidence 
in toxic tort cases and many types of forensic evidence? 
Importantly, does it condemn us to perpetually accepting a low 
threshold when there is little available science? I believe that if 
we properly understand the nature of the contextual approach, 
the answer is no. Allow me to elaborate. 
If the contextual approach tells courts to require a level 
of justification that is as good as practicably possible, how 
should courts understand the context within which to apply 
this standard? Should the relevant context only be the case at 
hand and the evidence available at that moment in time, or 
should we take a longer view? If we focus solely on the case at 
hand, that is, if we set the level of necessary justification to 
reflect the state of knowledge at the moment a particular case 
is being tried, we may find ourselves permanently settling for 
relatively little by way of justification.126 If, on the other hand, 
  
 123 With respect to the former question, at least in those areas where experts 
employ their expertise outside the courtroom, I believe the best answer is to require 
experts to use the same intellectual rigor they employ in their day-to-day work. See 
Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539 (2007). This means 
that even in the same general area of litigation, e.g. toxic torts, the courts may require 
more justification when there is substantially more evidence available. This, 
apparently, is what courts in fact generally do. See David L. Faigman et al., How Good 
is Good Enough? Expert Evidence under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
645 (2000). 
 124 “The best that is reasonably available should be admitted, at least so far as 
the reliability requirement of Rule 702 is concerned.” Dale Nance, Reliability and the 
Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL. L. REV. 191, 241 (2003). 
 125 “One appropriate focal point for the judge, it seems to me, ought to be 
whether the expert evidence on offer is as reliable as it can reasonably be, considering 
the particular context and circumstances.” Mnookin, supra note 96, at 133. 
 126 This does not mean courts will settle for anything. For example, under 
some fact patterns even the relatively lenient standard prevalent in specific causation 
cases may be insurmountable. Consider, for example, Newton v. Roche Labs., Inc., 243 
F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Tex. 2002). In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that exposure to 
Accutane induced their child’s schizophrenia. Excluding the differential diagnosis 
testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert, the court noted: 
Dr. Rossiter’s conclusion that Accutane induced Candis’s schizophrenia relies 
solely on the temporal proximity of her illness and her taking of the drug. 
However, he does not adequately consider that Candis’s uncle and sister were 
schizophrenic and her mother outwardly exhibited symptoms consistent with 
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we take a longer view, we concern ourselves with the impact of 
present admissibility decisions on the body of foreseeable 
future science and foreseeable future cases. I believe that the 
better course of action is for courts to adopt this longer view.  
The longer view is superior because it allows us to 
recognize situations where the courts may be able to push 
lawyers and, to the extent possible, science toward better 
evidence. Moving the system toward better evidence can be 
accomplished in two ways: by improving the mix of cases and by 
and improving the underlying science. I discuss each in turn.  
Improving the mix of cases. At any point in time, an 
admissibility ruling produces a shadow effect on future cases. A 
decision that admits expert testimony puts pressure on the 
other side to mount a more complete case, by including 
stronger opposing expertise. An exclusionary decision has the 
opposite effect: it encourages proponents of such cases to 
produce better evidence in the future.127 
It may be that the nature of the science available on a 
legal question and the quality of the expert opinions available 
to report on that science are a constant. In this situation, a 
higher standard can affect the mix of cases that are litigated, 
but it cannot influence the quality of future cases. On the other 
hand, if lawyers have not presented the best possible evidence 
or have employed less well qualified experts, then a heightened 
admissibility standard may improve the quality of evidence in 
the same type of cases.128  
Improving the science. In most situations, scientific 
investigations are, at best, marginally influenced by what is 
going on in court. When an area of litigation becomes a hot 
topic, this may spur some research. For example, there is 
evidence that the litigation surrounding the drug Bendectin 
generated some research that would not otherwise have been 
  
schizophrenia; Candis was severely malnourished in her early childhood; and 
Candis’s natural father was sixty years old at the time of her birthCall of 
which Dr. Rossiter agrees are considered risk factors for the natural onset of 
schizophrenia. Dr. Rossiter’s reaction to this evidence was only that Accutane 
could also be a possible contributing cause. 
Id. at 683. 
 127 Because this article focuses on two areas where admissibility decisions are 
lax, I focus my attention on the effect of tightening admissibility standards. 
 128 There is some evidence that this may have happened in some civil cases. 
Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in 
Federal Civil Cases Since Daubert, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 251, 298-99 (2002). 
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published.129 Note, however, that it was the litigation itself, not 
admissibility rulings per se that led to a better scientific 
understanding of the issue at hand. The influence of legal 
opinions on the production of science may be much stronger in 
situations where the legal system itself is the primary market 
for the information.130   
All of this suggests that from the perspective of a longer 
view, the specific causation in toxic tort cases and in forensic 
cases is not the same. The impact of admissibility decisions is 
likely to be greater in forensic cases.  
In both areas, admissibility rulings may influence the 
mix of cases. And marginally, they may influence the quality of 
expertise presented in a particular trial.131 However, adverse 
admissibility rulings are likely to have a larger effect on case 
mix in the forensic setting. This is due to the social 
organization of criminal prosecutions when compared to the 
social organization of tort litigations. The latter is much less 
well organized. Many tort claims are brought by small time 
entrepreneurial tort lawyers. And even when the plaintiff’s bar 
is more organized, as it often is with respect to mass torts, 
there is a much more limited hierarchical structure. Individual 
lawyers may bring relatively weak cases, unimpeded by 
concerns for the larger body of claims. This is somewhat less 
likely, at least within any given prosecutor’s office, where an 
adverse ruling in a given case may impact other similar cases 
brought in the future. 
However, the most substantial difference between the 
toxic and the forensic situation is in the ability of admissibility 
rulings to influence the science itself. On the civil side, lawyers 
might wish that scientists would do more research of direct 
relevance to their cases and on rare occasions may even fund 
  
 129 “Jean Goldberg, author of a[n]. . . article on Bendectin and oral clefts, 
noted, ‘if nothing had been happening over the drug . . . I doubt even whether I would 
have written it up.’” JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT 
LITIGATION 63 (1998) (quoting MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: 
THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 332 (1996)). Some research 
may be mandated by the government. The largest animal study on Bendectin was 
conducted at the specific request of the Food and Drug Administration. JOSEPH 
SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL 63 (1998).  
 130 Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences: The Troubled Marriage Between 
Science and the Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 16 (2009). 
 131 Because the parties in some civil cases may have more resources than the 
parties in a criminal trial, they may be in a better position to respond to an adverse 
admissibility ruling by seeking out better experts and better existing data in 
subsequent cases. However, they may not be in a superior position when it comes to 
generating new data. 
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research, but by and large the scientists have their own agenda 
over which the legal system has very little influence. This is 
not the case with respect to many forensic areas. The legal 
regime is the primary market for most types of forensic science. 
Indeed, a substantial percentage of the people who work in this 
area are the employees of legal entities. This community’s 
failure to respond to legal signals will have a significant impact 
on its livelihood. Moreover, the hierarchical structure of the 
criminal justice system makes it relatively easy for the legal 
system to organize a research strategy.132  
Of course, if there are no scientific improvements to be 
made, legal influence will come to naught.133 But as I noted in 
the discussion of fingerprint identification,134 there are both 
short run and long run ways to improve the quality of at least 
some types of forensic evidence.  
VII. ADMISSIBILITY STRATEGIES FOCUSED ON THE LONGER 
VIEW 
Assuming that I am correct that admissibility decisions 
can have a greater impact in forensic cases and that using 
these decisions to push litigators in the direction of better 
  
 132 I do not want to leave the impression that admissibility decisions have no 
potential influence on the quality of science in the toxic tort specific causation situation. 
The path to improving the evidence in these cases is less well defined, but it is not non-
existent. Most significantly, the field of toxicogenomics offers the long run possibility that 
we will be able to ascertain causation at the level of the individual case, radically 
changing all specific causation testimony. See generally, Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and 
Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 949 (2001); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic 
Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7 (2006); Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: 
Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671 (2007).  
  In the shorter run, genetic information may assist traditional specific 
causation testimony by allowing experts to make better estimates that the various 
possible causes of a disease played a role in the plaintiff’s case. See Gary E. Marchant, 
Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7 (2006).  
  In addition, one could envision some level of proficiency testing for specific 
causation clinical judgments, but the reality is that this approach would be of very 
limited value because in most cases of interest we simply do not know what caused the 
plaintiff’s injury and, therefore, we would have no way of knowing if the expert’s 
judgment was or was not correct. 
 133 For example, we might wish to have some type of proficiency testing in 
toxic tort cases to ascertain the error rate of physicians making differential diagnoses. 
Unfortunately, because there is no way to know the ground truth in toxic cases, i.e. 
what did cause the plaintiff’s illness, proficiency testing is not a viable avenue of 
investigation.  
 134 See supra Part IV.A. 
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science is a good thing,135 how should courts go about this task? 
There are several alternatives.  
Immediately excluding whole areas of testimony. The 
most radical approach to improving the quality of evidence 
would be to declare a body of expertise inadmissible until the 
proponent is able to produce better evidence. The temptation to 
espouse this solution in the forensics area is fortified by the 
lackadaisical, even obstructionist attitude of some practitioners 
in the field. For example, the fingerprint examiner community 
clings to a set of conceptual perspectives and professional 
norms that discourage testing.136 Experts claim that their 
technique has an error rate of zero. That is, they assert 
certainty that when they declare a match they have matched 
the latent print under investigation to the one and only person 
in the entire world whose finger could have produced the 
print.137 This position is the product of what Professors Saks 
and Koehler label the “Individualization Fallacy,” which they 
define as “placing an object in a unit category that consists of a 
single unit. Individualization implies uniqueness.”138 The 
  
 135 I am far from the first person to argue for this approach. Professor 
Mnookin makes the same point in the following passage. 
Practically speaking, what should Daubert mean? How high a standard of 
reliability ought trial judges to impose before permitting expert evidence 
before a jury? One appropriate focal point for the judge, it seems to me, ought 
to be whether the expert evidence on offer is as reliable as it can reasonably 
be, considering the particular context and circumstances. Validity under 
Daubert is not an on/off switch or an all or nothing proposition. It is, at least 
to some degree, appropriately contextual and gradational: reliability ought to 
be determined in relation to what information is available or what 
information could or should have been available with reasonable effort. 
Mnookin, supra note 96, at 133; see also Michael J. Risinger, Goodbye To All That, Or a 
Fool’s Errand, By One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to 
Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic Science” in General) and Learned to Love 
Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447 (2007) (decrying 
the willingness of some courts to admit every handwriting expert, regardless of the 
justification for the expert’s position). 
 136 See Simon A. Cole, Comment on ‘Scientific Validation of Fingerprint 
Evidence Under Daubert’, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 119 (2008). 
 137 See Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and Into the Fryeing Pan? Self 
Validation, Meta-Expertise and the Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye 
Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 453, 470 (2008); Mnookin, supra note 96, at 
139. As Mnookin notes, an examiner might face a disciplinary sanction if she were to 
testify that a match between the latent print and the comparison print was only 
“likely” or “probable.” Id. 
 138 Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in 
Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 205 (2008). The fallacy leads to 
statements such as a firearms examiner’s testimony that he is able to identify an 
unknown weapon “to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world.” United States 
v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic 
 
2010] APPLYING DAUBERT INCONSISTENTLY? 1401 
position is indefensible.139 It engenders a response that says, “if 
they think that, then they should not be allowed to testify at all.” 
Nevertheless, if the history of admissibility decisions in 
the forensics area teaches us anything, it is that this approach 
is not going to win favor with the courts. Elected judges might 
well be committing re-election suicide by excluding key 
evidence in a criminal case, but even the life-tenured federal 
judiciary seems unwilling to take such a step.  
Prohibiting testimony about individual causation. 
Another option is to limit what experts can say with respect to 
the particular case. There is some precedent for this solution. 
When expert evidence on eyewitness identification is 
permitted, it is generally restricted to general testimony about 
the factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.140 Testimony about 
whether or not a particular witness is correct is almost always 
prohibited.141 A few courts have placed similar restrictions on 
  
Science: Under the Microscope, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 315, 323-24 (2008). Similarly, we 
have a forensic dentist’s testimony that the defendant “was the only person in the 
world who could have inflicted the bite marks on [the murder victim’s] body.” Otero v. 
Warnick, 614 N.W.2d 177, 178 (Mich. App. 2000). Fortunately for the plaintiff in Otero, 
“the Detroit Police Crime Laboratory [later] released a supplemental report that 
concluded that [he] was excluded as a possible source of DNA obtained from vaginal 
and rectal swabs taken from [the victim’s] body.” Id. at 178. Otero is a civil suit by the 
alleged offender against the dentist for gross negligence in his investigation and 
testimony. Id. The court found that the dentist owed no duty to the plaintiff. Id. at 182. 
For a discussion of the limits of civil suits as a method of holding expert witnesses 
accountable, see Sanders, supra note 123, at 1562-72. 
 139 “Given the general lack of validity testing for fingerprinting, the relative 
dearth of difficult proficiency tests, the lack of a statistically valid model of 
fingerprinting and the lack of validated standards for declaring a match, such claims of 
absolute, certain confidence in identification are unjustified.” Mnookin, supra note 96, 
at 139. 
 140 See 2 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 16.  
 141 Ordinarily, experts on eyewitness identificationsCor the courts in which 
they testifyClimit their testimony to the general principles derived from sound 
empirical research. One exception appears to have been the testimony of Dr. Gerald 
Loftus in United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001). Applying the general 
finding of eyewitness research to the case at hand, according to the court:  
Dr. Loftus stated that “it’s two to three times as likely that the identification 
in the photo montage was made based on seeing the photograph four weeks 
earlier than it was based on seeing the individual” who fled on October 14, 
1998. 
Id. at 334. 
  At least one treatise written by a well known investigator in the field made 
the following comments concerning this type of testimony: 
Without the transcript of the trial, it is impossible to say what literature Dr. 
Loftus relied upon in making these conclusions regarding the likely accuracy 
of a particular witness’ specific identification. To our knowledge, there is no 
research support in the scientific literature for the validity of such clinical 
opinions. In psychology, work on eyewitness identifications has, on the whole, 
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handwriting experts. For example, the expert is permitted to 
testify about general features that distinguish individual 
handwriting, but not whether a particular signature is a forgery.142  
As attractive as this alternative may be in some 
criminal law contexts, were it ever to be used on the civil side it 
would run directly into the plaintiff’s burden to prove specific 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. And simply 
because there is no expert opinion on the individual causation 
question does not mean that the jury can avoid the issue. It 
must decide if this signature is a forgery or if the plaintiff’s 
disease was caused by the defendant. We do not know enough 
about jury decision making to know whether the quality of the 
jury’s judgment would benefit from restricting expert testimony 
in this way. 
Exclude the worst testimony. This alternative assumes 
that even in areas where there is little science we may still 
distinguish levels of reliability, and that some testimony is so 
unreliable that it fails a minimal threshold of reliability. One 
way to think about such a situation is to conclude that the 
expert is not an expert at all because the area of so-called 
expertise does not exist. The “expert” witness is a lay witness 
in disguise.  
This approach has the advantage of incrementalism. One 
does not need to make global pronouncements concerning a 
particular type of expert testimony. For example, courts might 
decide to admit handwriting expert testimony when the task is 
to determine whether a signature is a forgery based on many 
exemplars of known authentic signatures while excluding 
testimony asserting the authorship of an attempted forgery.143  
  
been of a kind that the field should be most proud. Indeed, no other topic has 
garnered the same degree of attention among psychologists. It has been 
unfortunate that courts have been slow to recognize the valuable insights this 
research has to offer the law. But psychologists should be cautioned not to 
overreach and offer opinions beyond what the data can support. Opinions 
regarding the accuracy of individual identification appear to exemplify just 
such overreaching. 
2 FAIGMAN, ET AL., supra note 35, at § 16:2. 
  The fact that the expert witness research community opposes 
particularistic testimony says a good deal about the gulf between clinicians and non-
clinicians. The community of eyewitness identification experts is comprised largely of 
experimental psychologists holding university professorships. Their expert culture 
causes them to resist clinical judgments about a specific identification.  
 142 Paul Giannelli, supra note 138, at 319 n.30 notes that this was the position 
of the courts in United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Neb. 2000) 
and United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 143 See generally Risinger, supra note 135. 
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The approach requires the courts to draw difficult lines 
and thus it threatens to produce inconsistent outcomes in close 
cases. Nevertheless, this may be the best that we can do in 
areas where admissibility decisions will not have a foreseeable 
impact on future cases or future science and the only goal 
courts can hope to achieve is to change the mix of cases by 
eliminating the weakest among them. 
Excluding evidence at some point in the future. There is 
an additional alternative that directly focuses on the longer 
view. A court could declare that at some future time the 
proponent of a type of evidence must present a better 
justification for its reliability or risk the exclusion. A precise 
timetable is not required. The court does not need to establish a 
date certain when evidence will no longer be admitted without 
better science. A vaguer nod to the future may well suffice. For 
example, the court could tell the United States that it should ask 
the F.B.I. to engage in significant, serious proficiency testing.144 
For all cases coming before district courts two or three years 
hence, experts testifying about a fingerprint identification 
should be prepared to present the results of such tests or 
indicate why this is not yet possible. The details of such an 
opinion are less important than the general requirement that 
the proponent work toward better justification for its position.  
I know of no cases that have adopted this position. In 
most situations, because of the very limited impact legal 
opinions have on advancements in our causal understanding, it 
would be unnecessary, inappropriate, or both. But in the 
forensic area we find ourselves in a unique chicken-and-egg 
situation. Because courts are committed to a contextual 
approach to justification, they permit forensic expert testimony 
with very little warrant. But this liberal approach 
unnecessarily helps to perpetuate the status quo. Absent the 
very unlikely prospect of a congressional mandate, the courts 
are in the best position to move us toward a time when forensic 
evidence stands on a more solid scientific foundation. 
  
 144 Because of the F.B.I.’s central role in the production of forensic evidence, 
the greatest impact would come from a federal circuit court opinion sets a timetable for 
improved evidence. One must be wary, of course, of the quality of research generated 
by the very organization being asked to provide evidence. On this point, the F.B.I.’s 
track record is anything but reassuring. For an insightful article on the less than 
evenhanded nature of past law-enforcement sponsored research efforts, see D. Risinger 
& Saks, supra note 112, at 1023. Given this record, a court might wish to stipulate in 
advance that the research is undertaken by an independent entity.  
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VIII. SUMMARY 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, trial courts are 
increasingly asked to assess the reliability of expert testimony. 
Testimony that is deemed to be insufficiently reliable is 
excluded. Many scholars argue that the courts apply the 
reliability requirement inconsistently. One frequently 
mentioned example is the use of liberal admissibility standards 
in criminal law forensic evidence cases and the use of stringent 
admissibility standards in tort law toxic tort cases. I argue that 
this apparent inconsistency misses a key point.  
Admissibility decisions in toxic tort cases appear to be 
stringent because they address two separate causal questions: 
evidence of general causation and evidence of specific 
causation. When we focus on admissibility decisions dealing 
exclusively with specific causation we see that courts adopt a 
liberal standard. I compare this standard with liberal 
admissibility standards in forensic cases, using fingerprint 
evidence as an example.  
In both situations, courts must decide a causal question 
with respect to a particular individual and often the only 
expertise available to address the issue is the judgment of a 
clinician, be that clinician a medical doctor or a fingerprint 
analyst. In neither situation does the expert have much by way 
of quantified, empirical evidence to support her conclusion. It is 
the relative lack of scientific information that causes the courts 
to lower their admissibility standard in both these situations. 
This liberal admissibility standard is consistent with 
law’s contextual approach to knowledge. A contextual approach 
varies the amount of justification necessary for an expert to 
express an opinion depending on the quantity and quality of 
evidence on the point. Admissibility standards with respect to 
questions of individual causation are relatively liberal because 
we have relatively little systematic scientific evidence on point.  
Unfortunately, the contextual approach does not create 
any incentive for the parties to improve the quality of evidence 
even in situations where this might be possible. I argue that 
some branches of forensics are such situations. When this 
occurs, courts should view the relevant context from a 
longitudinal perspective and adjust their admissibility rulings 
accordingly. 
